![]() |
![]() |
| HOME | MEMBERSHIP | PUBLICATIONS | TECHNICAL SERVICES | MEETINGS EDUCATION | FOUNDATION | |||||
|
SEARCH AOCS:
![]() |
HOME > MEMBERSHIP > SECTIONS > LATIN > REGIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS
DURING THE 1990s: Often the press and other media
refer to international trade negotiations. However, very few entrepreneurs
have the chance to familiarize themselves with the features and content
of these agreementsin particular, what they do, or do not, entail.
The purpose of this article is to represent a small step in filling
this gap. In particular, this note purports to be an eye opener to those
thousands of North American entrepreneurs who still have not discovered
all the opportunities awaiting them in Latin America as a result of
the process of regional trade integration. Bilateral Partial Scope Agreements (BIPSAs) The Bilateral "Partial
Scope" Agreements ("BIPSAs") comprise the most numerous category of
the existing RTAs in the Western Hemisphere. There are 26 in total,
and most of these agreements were negotiated before the 1990s under
the auspices of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) which later
became Third, the BIPSAs are limited to trade in goods. They do not contain provisions on trade in services, investment, and intellectual property or government procurement. Fourth, and probably the main
defect of this kind of agreements, is that the BIPSAs do not contain
any kind of dispute settlement adjudication procedures, and simply rely
on government-to-government consultations to solve any conflict regarding
the application or interpretation of the agreement. It should not surprise,
then, that such a loophole has rendered the tariff preferences very
vulnerable to domestic protectionist pressures. First, all of these agreements
are plurilateral its membership comprising at least four countriesand
all of them constitute subregional groupings established along geographic
lines. Third, and as a consequence
of the significant market-oriented reforms undertaken within their member
countries, during the last decade the old customs unions have been going
through a process of modernization. The new domestic and international
economic context is increasingly calling for the redefinition of the
objectives and rationale of these old customs unions. Attempts to modernize
these integration schemes have proven to be a very difficult task. First, through these free trade agreements there has been a qualitative improvement in the level of rules and disciplines applicable to intra-regional trade. Indeed, the FTAs negotiated during this period contain comprehensive tariff liberalization programs based on a negative list approach. That is, over a period of timeusually spanning from 0 to 15 yearsthe Parties to an FTA, in principle, will grant duty free access to practically all their reciprocal trade, with just a few exceptions which must be explicitly listed for that purpose. Second, the FTAs also establish
a number of rules and disciplines to avoid the tariff liberalization
program being eroded by the use of non-tariff barriers. In this regard,
it is worth noting that most FTAs practically cover the same wide range
of matters regulated by the GATT. Fourth, there is a remarkable
similarity among the scope and features of most FTAs. This is not a
coincidence. Most of the texts of the FTAs negotiated between Latin
American countries during the 1990s have an evident resemblance with
NAFTA. Most Latin American countries have acted on the assumption that
following such a model will be useful in preparing for their future
membership in the FTAA, and using the bilateral and subregional FTAs
as "building blocs" for the future hemispheric free trade area. From an economic perspective,
there are four main trends that can be observed in the process of regional
economic integration in the Americas During the 19911998 period,
intra-hemispheric exports grew at an average rate of 11 percent per
annum, while exports from the Western Hemisphere to the world as a whole
grew at a rate of 7.9 percent, and exports to countries beyond the Americas
at a rate of 4.7 percent. There is no doubt then, that, during the last
decade the growth of intra-hemispheric exports has been more dynamic
than the export growth from the Western Hemisphere to the rest of the
world. Thus, significant shares of Latin American exports are sold either in the United States, the European Union, or the rest of the world. The weight of the U.S. market as a destination for Latin American exports varies significantly depending on the geographic location of the exporting countries. While for countries such as Mexico, those of Central America, the Caribbean Basin, and even of the Andean Community the United States is the main destination for their exports, for the members of MERCOSUR, their own subregional market has become the main destination for their exports. Thus, in terms of trade flows,
a bipolar pattern has emerged, with the U.S. market as a center of gravitation
in the northern part of the hemisphere and MERCOSUR in the southern
cone. As will be explained below, this fact has several implications,
in particular for the political economy of the FTAA negotiations as
well as for other subregional trade integration initiatives in the Western
Hemisphere. The interaction of regional
integration and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is braking old paradigms
The negotiation of regional trade agreements has promoted increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Latin America in two different ways. In the countries of the Caribbean Basin and Mexico, the negotiation of NAFTA and the enactment of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) brought greater certainty regarding the market access conditions into the U.S. market. This fact has allowed multinational enterprises to invest abroad, promoting efficiency-seeking FDI in the region. Thus, numerous multinational enterprises have located productive facilities in these countries as part of vertical integration strategies, using the region as a production and export platform for the North American market. These multinational enterprises then are transforming the competitive position of the host economies and are shifting their production and trade structures toward exports in dynamic automobile, electronics, and textile industries. Thus, if oil is no longer Mexico´s main export product, or coffee that of Costa Rica, or sugar that of Dominican Republic, it is to a great extent due to the qualitative impact that FDI has had over the productive sector of these countries. Further, given the outward orientation of this kind of FDI, such flows could have never developed if exporters had not had certainty regarding their duty free or preferential access to the North American market. Such degree of certainty is the result of the existence of regional trade agreements. Regionalism has also had an
important, but somewhat different, impact in attracting FDI flows into
the southern cone. Contrary to the case of Mexico and the Caribbean
Basin, recent FDI in South America has tended to concentrate in non-tradable
services manufacturing for local markets and natural-resource-based
commodities. However, the establishment of a wider market through the
negotiation of MERCOSUR has been instrumental in promoting market-seeking
FDI into these countries. Despite the fact that such FDI tends to be
inward-orientedthat is, aimed at exploiting the local market rather
than another abroadthere is no doubt that during the 1990s, as
during the 1950s1980s, these capital flows have played a significant
role in promoting the industrialization of the economies in the Southern
Cone, in particular those with the bigger dimensions such as Argentina
and Brazil. However, during the last decade, market-oriented reform
has prevented multinational corporations from benefitting from a "tariff
jumping" strategy, forcing even those primarily focused on the regional
market to face extra-regional competition. FDI is no longer a North-South
phenomenon: the emerging Latin American multinational corporations Regardless of how predominant
the negotiation of regional trade agreements may have been in promoting
the increase in intra-Latin American FDI flows, these trends have a
significant implication: new multinational enterprises are emerging
in Latin America. Thus, neither MNEs nor FDI can continue to be perceived
as creatures of the developed world. What is the FTAA? The starting ideas which underpin the FTAA process are to be found in the Declaration of Principles which emerged from the Summit of the Americas held in Miami in December of 1994. At the Miami Summit, the Heads of State of 34 countries of the Western Hemisphere agreed to begin a multi-faceted process of political and technical/legal consultations aimed at: preserving and strengthening
democracy; Market Access Government Procurement The results of the first year of negotiations were examined by Trade Ministers in Toronto in November 1999. On this occasion, each negotiating and consultative group submitted a report to the Ministers, and in the case of the negotiating groups, the report contained a preliminary annotated outline of the provisions which were to be included in each specific chapter of the future FTAA Agreement. Considering the progress made, Ministers ambitiously agreed to go one step forward in the construction of the FTAA, and mandated the negotiating groups to prepare a preliminary consolidated text of each chapter of the FTAA Agreement. This bracketed draft contained the positions of all the negotiating parties and was initially submitted at the Ministerial Meeting held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in early 2001. FTAA: What is next? In 1889, James D. Blaine, then
U.S. Secretary of State, proposed the establishment of a Pan-American
Customs Union. More than 100 years later, the dynamic forces of trade
and investment are gradually contributing to integrate the Americas
in that direction. As demonstrated in this note, the FTAA process is
not an isolated event, but rather an initiative aimed at organizing
and maximizing the benefits that numerous agreements are bringing to
entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers in the Americas. |
President: Phone: +54 3476422045 Vice President: Phone: +1 8476343090 Treasurer: Phone: +598 29290707 CORCHIGA Representative: Phone: +56 26781665 ASAGA Representative: Phone: +54 3414102160 Mexico Representative: Phone: +52 2222881188 Caribbean Countries Representative: Phone: +503 2127030 Accounts Review Committee: Phone: +56 24414111 Eduardo Dubinsky, Argentina Phone: +54 1147424160 Ad Honoren Colaborator: Phone: +52 5556834807
Phone: +54 3414223227
Phone: +55 483315367
Phone: +54 3414249170 Immediate Past President/SBOG Representative: Phone: +55 1937883231
|
|
|
[ Home | Advanced Search | Marketing Opportunities | Terms and Conditions ] [ About Us | AOCS Connection | AOCS Mission Statement | Bylaws | Site Map | Contact Us ] AOCS 2710 S. Boulder, Urbana, IL 61802-6996 USA Phone: +1-217-359-2344 Fax: +1-217-351-8091 Copyright © 2008 The American Oil Chemists' Society |
|